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TRIPPE

S.

FRIED*

INTRODUCTION

Both the American and international economies have undergone
profound changes over the past twenty years. A swift succession of
technological advances has multiplied the competitive opportunities
for small businesses; to quote journalist and author Thomas Friedman,
innovations from fiber optics to the internet have "flattened the
world."1 Markets that were once the exclusive province of cash-rich,
publicly traded, multinational corporations are now open to almost all
businesses without regard to the size or location of the enterprise. The
"Mom and Pop" store located on the town square of a rural municipality can, with a minimal investment, offer its goods worldwide. As a
result, the competition among businesses for clients and customers
has never been fiercer. In order to thrive, sellers must offer their wares
in a form and with the functionality demanded by consumers.2 To
borrow another Friedman analogy, for the purchasing power of the
modern consumer the internet is a steroid, and today's customer is
flexing his muscles.3
Providers of goods and services across almost all industries have
been forced to adapt quickly to the marketplace of the new millennium. The legal profession is no different; for lawyers to offer the best
possible representation to their small business clients, they must have
the tools to deal with the realities of modern transactions. A small
software company in Nashville can easily have strategic alliances with
venture capitalists in San Francisco, programmers and call centers in
India, an advertising firm in London, and a distributor in Louisville.
The business next door may import a product from Turkey and use
distribution centers in Toronto, Baltimore, and Seattle to bring that
item to points across North America. A lawyer based in Nashville representing either of those companies will work with colleagues across
the country and the world to establish the legal framework under
* Trippe Fried is a graduate of Tufts University and the University of Tennessee
College of Law. He is an attorney and the founder and CEO of a business consulting
firm in Nashville.
1. THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD Is FLAT 48 (2005).
2. Id. at 340.
3. See id. at 161.
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which such cooperative commercial enterprises will operate. The laws
of Tennessee will obviously not be the only ones in play. However,
under the current regulatory system for lawyers, any effort to render
advice or provide services in a jurisdiction in which the attorney is not
licensed is an invitation for trouble.4 Should the software client really
be compelled to hire counsel in Tennessee, California, Bangalore,
England, and Kentucky?
Commentators have been discussing the ramifications of multijurisdictional practice on clients, lawyers, and the legal profession for
years. While several broad solutions for issues raised by interstate representation have been circulated among academics and interest
groups, as a practical matter little has changed. Moreover, the legal
community seems to continue to assume that regional or national representation remains the exclusive province of the largest firms even
though today's marketplace grants small firms and sole practitioners
many of the same opportunities to offer services across state boundaries. In fact, for those lawyers who represent corporations or assist in
transactions, interstate and international practice is increasingly
becoming the norm. Clients need counsel unrestricted by state lines.
Lawyers need the authority to properly serve these clients and the guidance to do so within generally accepted ethical parameters.
This article explores a key question for the future of the legal profession: does a paradigm in which each individual state has exclusive
control over the practice of law within its borders work in the marketplace of Friedman's "flat world"? Or in today's global economy does
state micromanagement of the legal profession so inure to the detriment of lawyers and clients that some form of national licensing is
necessary? This article reaches the conclusion that to effectively provide legal services to business clients, lawyers must be given the flexibility to operate outside of the boundaries of their licensing states
without fear of running afoul of ethical restrictions or statutes prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law. The goal of any licensing
regime should be to promote access to efficient and competent representation. While federal control over attorney certification is not a
practical solution, the best approach is a form of state-issued law
4. The only current means for a lawyer to obtain authorization to practice in
another state are (i) taking its bar exam, (ii) admission through reciprocity, (iii)
admission through provisions similar to American Bar Association Model Rule 5.5 or
8.5, (iv) statutory admission as in house counsel in some jurisdictions, (v) admission
pro hac vice, or (vi) admission to federal practice. See Pamela A. McManus, Have Law
License; Will Travel, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 527, 532-35 (2002); MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.5 (2008).
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license that permits qualified attorneys to practice in any jurisdiction
in the United States.
I.

A NEW TWIST

ON AN OLD ISSUE

The debate over the propriety of multijurisdictional practice goes
to the core of that quintessential American political issue: how should
power be distributed between the federal and state governments?5
Until recently, constitutional law, political ideology, and practical economics dictated that the licensing and oversight of attorneys be the
exclusive prerogative of the individual states.6 Recognizing the inherent sovereignty of the nation's constituent jurisdictions, the Constitution specifically granted the states control over matters not reserved
for the federal government.7 Thus, in the absence of a constitutional
mandate to the contrary, it was a state's prerogative to decide who
could serve as its judges and jurists without federal interference. A
states' rights framework was also sound economics. Who was better
qualified to choose the individuals responsible for interpreting and
enforcing state laws than the citizens of that state?8
In theory and practice, the nationalization of certain functions of
government has always been necessary for both the survival of the
United States as a sovereign polity and the well-being of its political
subdivisions.9 For example, the Federalists, led by Alexander Hamilton, recognized that the concentration of some power in a national
authority was good policy. 10 By way of proof, Hamilton endorsed unilaterally applied, stringently protectionist economic policies, including
trade restraints, to more rapidly increase America's commercial
strength and keep the fledgling nation from being overly dependent on
5. See, e.g., Edward J. Clearly, Crossing State Lines: Multijurisdictional Practice,
(Oct. 2000), available at http://mnbar.org/benchand
bar/2000/oct00/multijurisdictional-prof-resp.htm (noting that federal legislation that
encroaches upon state regulatory rights has recently been struck down by the United
States Supreme Court).
6. Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 442 (1979) (licensing of attorneys is the exclusive
province of each state and the District of Columbia).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
8. Conversely, the federal judiciary was created under the purview of a national
constitution and remains subject to federal regulation and oversight. U.S. CONST. art.
III.
9. Edward M. Earle, Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, FriedrichList: The Economic
Foundations of Military Power, in THE MAKERS OF MODERN STRATEGY FROM MACHIAVELLI
BENCH AND BAR OF MINNESOTA

TO THE

NUCLEAR AGE 217, 247 (Peter Paret ed., 1986).

10. Id. at 232.
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European economies.1 1 The rights to print money and wage war were
also vested exclusively in the federal government. 1 2 This made economic sense: North Carolina itself would lack the resources to wage
war on or negotiate workable commercial treaties with the likes of
Great Britain or France. The states could accomplish much more in
the international marketplace through collaboration even though this
13
required ceding certain rights to a central authority.
Issues surrounding the division of power between the state and
federal governments are generally resolved in light of economic realities. In today's economy, practical considerations dictate that, at least
with respect to the licensing and oversight of legal professionals, the
balance must shift away from the states' rights position and toward the
Hamiltonian approach. Vesting complete control of the practice of law
to the individual states inures to the detriment of both lawyer and client. The adverse impact of the system is felt particularly in the areas of
corporate and transactional law. Because clients are seeking vendors
and customers all over the country and the world, their attorneys must
have the flexibility to address issues beyond jurisdictional borders.
II.

PROBLEMS FOR BOTH ATTORNEYS AND CLIENTS

The general goal of state licensing authorities is the protection of
the interests of the jurisdiction's citizens. With respect to oversight of
attorneys, professional responsibility boards are designed to protect
consumers of legal services from those lacking the competency and
scruples to effectively and honestly represent their clients. 4 Regulation comes in the form of state rules of professional conduct prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law and dictating both required and
prohibited conduct of licensed lawyers. 5 While some policing of the
legal profession is clearly necessary, oversight comes with an opportu11. Id. at 234.
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
13. The states' authority over the licensing and oversight of lawyers has never been
absolute. It is subject to the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the United States
Constitution, which allows individuals from one state to "ply their trade" in another.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court has struck
down residency restrictions on legal practice. Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470
U.S. 274, 288 (1985).
14. McManus, supra note 4, at 528.
15. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (2008), available at http://
www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/mrpc toc.html; N.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5
(2008), available at http://www.ncbar.com/rules/rules.asp; S.C. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 5.5, available at http://www.sccourts.org/courtReg/displayRule.cfm?rule
ID=407.0&subRulelD=RULE%205%2E5&ruleType=APP.
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nity cost for the client. For businesses and entrepreneurs, increased
regulation often translates into decreased transactional efficiency.
Under the system in place today, these clients are forced to hire multiple attorneys to represent them in the same matter because the current
oversight scheme does not sufficiently account for multijurisdictional
relationships. The costs to the client in terms of time and money can
be exorbitant. Regulation that is economically deleterious to the people and entities it is designed to protect should not be sustained.
Ethics rules must also provide critical guidance to lawyers in
terms of what constitutes permissible conduct. Under the current
scheme, providing services to clients with interests in multiple jurisdictions can be patently dangerous for an attorney. 1 6 Ethical rules vary
from state to state; some jurisdictions apply the American Bar Association's Model Code of Professional Conduct, others use the more recent
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and still more have implemented
differing mixtures of the two.' 7 This raises several issues for attorneys
who represent businesses across state lines. When does representation become multijurisdictional? Does a phone call or an e-mail to a
client or witness in another state constitute the unauthorized practice
of law? Which state-the lawyer's licensing state, the one in which
services are performed, or the jurisdiction having its laws construed or
in which legal issues have arisen-has enforcement authority over the
lawyer, and which jurisdiction's ethical provisions are applicable? In
the event of a discrepancy between states' rules of professional conduct, to which should counsel adhere? A lawyer is generally subject to
the disciplinary rules of the licensing state regardless of the location in
which alleged misconduct took place.' 8 Nonetheless, a lawyer may
also be prosecuted under a foreign jurisdiction's statutes prohibiting
the unauthorized practice of law.' 9
16. See, e.g., Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949
P.2d 1, 12-13 (Cal. 1998) (holding void client's contractual obligation to pay law firm
a million dollars in fees when New York law firm with no attorneys licensed in
California represented a California corporation in a matter in California).
17. Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. REv. 335, 341 (1995).
18. Susanna Felleman, Ethical Dilemmas and the Multistate Lawyer: A Proposed
Amendment to the Choice-of-Law Rule in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1500 (1995).
19. See, e.g., ORE. R. STAT. § 9.990 (2007) (making practice of law by any person
not a member of the Oregon bar a criminal offense); TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3-103
(1994) (making practice of law by an out-of-state attorney a misdemeanor unless the
attorney associates local counsel); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 757.30 (West 2001) (making
practice of law by any person not licensed in Wisconsin a criminal offense).
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In sum, both clients and attorneys are stuck in an untenable situation.2 ° Clients need services that require their attorneys to learn and
use foreign laws and to interact and cooperate with extrajudicial
actors. However, in order to adequately represent their clients, lawyers
must take potentially extraordinary risks, the nature and extent of
which may not be appreciated.2 1
III.

BABY STEPS

This dilemma has not gone completely unnoticed. In 1993, the
American Bar Association (ABA) modified Rule 8.5 of the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct to address choice of law issues in the enforcement of ethical provisions.2 2 Nine years later, the ABA Committee on
Multijurisdictional Practice issued recommendations with respect to
lawyers practicing in multiple states. 23 It called for the continuation of
the state-by-state licensing system in the absence of a workable proposal for a nationalized protocol. 24 At the same time, it changed Rule 5.5
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct to allow litigators to act in
jurisdictions in which they were not licensed if they rendered services
on a non-systematic and non-continuous basis, associated local counsel, and were authorized or anticipated being authorized to appear
before a tribunal in the foreign jurisdiction. 2 ' A similar provision was
made for lawyers involved in alternative dispute resolution.2 6 For
transactional attorneys, the proposed rule permitted them to work in
20. An attorney's liberty interests may even be at stake, as most states make the
unauthorized practice of law a criminal offense. See e.g., Quintin Johnstone,
UnauthorizedPracticeof Law and the Power of State Courts: Difficult Problems and Their
Resolution, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV 795, 806-07 (2003).
21. The client is also adversely affected by the balkanized ethical framework. For
example, a client may be less likely to reveal critical information if he is unsure as to
which legal standards apply. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981)
(explaining that a client will not disclose incriminating facts to counsel unless the
client can be sure that the information will be kept confidential); see also Steven
Bradford, Conflict of Laws and the Attorney-Client Privilege: A TerritorialSolution, 52 U.
PITT. L. REv. 909, 943 (1991).
22. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.5 (2008).
23. On August 12, 2002, the ABA House of Delegates adopted all of the
recommendations of the Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice. See COMM'N ON
MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE, AM. BAR ASS'N, REPORT 201B (2002), availableat http://
www.abanet.org/cpr/mjp/home.html (follow Report 201B hyperlink).
24. COMM'N ON MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE, AM. BAR ASS'N, CLIENT
REPRESENTATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 15-16 (2002), available at http://www.abanet.
org/cpr/mjp/final-mjp-rpt_ 121702.pdf.
25. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (2008).
26. Id. at R. 5.5(c).
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foreign jurisdictions in areas of the law in which that lawyer practiced
in his home state. 27 An additional modification for in-house counsel
was also included.2 8
The ABA also recommended further revising the rules governing
choice of laws to give the host state more regulatory control over visiting attorneys.2 9 Under the new disciplinary regime, a lawyer practicing in a foreign jurisdiction was required to comply with the
regulations of that state and was subject to disciplinary action there.3"
The focus shifted away from the location in which counsel was
licensed and to the place where services were rendered.
State bar associations also struggled with the rapidly increasing
prevalence of multijurisdictional practice. 3 1 For example, in 2001, the
State Bar of Georgia commissioned a study that was "intended to bring
into focus the interstate and international realities of practicing law
today and to suggest how, if at all, the Georgia Rules of Professional
Conduct and other regulations that govern the bar need to change to
adapt to those realities. '3 2 Based on its findings, the State Bar's Committee on Multijurisdictional Practice called for the adoption of the
ABA's recommendations listed above.3 3 Amended rules, including the
committee's proposals, were codified by order of the Georgia Supreme
Court dated June 8, 2004." 4 A number of other states also adopted the
ABA's proposed modifications. 5
While a step in the right direction, these modifications to the rules
governing the practice of law fall short of serving the best interests of
either the bar or the business clients that many lawyers serve. Instead
of promoting transactional efficiency, they codify many of the practices-particularly requiring the association of local counsel-that
27. Id.

28. Id. at R. 5.5(d).
29. Id. at R. 8.5.
30. Id.; MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 6 (2007).
31. With the exception of Kansas, every state has, at the very least, created a
committee to study the American Bar Association's (ABA) recommendations on
multijurisdictional practice. See State Implementation of ABA Model Rule 5.5 (Sept.
29, 2008), http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mjp/quick-guide-5.5.pdf.
32. COMM. ON MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE, STATE BAR OF GA., FINAL REPORT 2
(2003), available at http://www.gabar.org/public/pdf/MJPFinalReport.pdf.
33. Id.
34. SUPREME COURT OF GA., AMENDMENT TO RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE ORG.
AND GoVT OF THE STATE BAR OF GA. Uune 8, 2004), available at www.gasupreme.us/
amendedrules/6 8 2004-order.php.
35. See State Implementation of ABA MJP Policies (Sept. 29, 2008), http://
www.abanet.org/cpr/mjp/recommedations.pdf.
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unnecessarily increase the cost of representation. As a result, they still
fail to address pressing needs of both counsel and client.
IV.

THE PROBLEM OF NATIONAL LICENSING

One suggested solution to the issues raised by multijurisdictional
practice is to federalize law licensing. The European Union has successfully implemented a continental regime that allows a lawyer from
one constituent country to practice in another upon registration in the
foreign jurisdiction. 3 6 Advocates of nationalization argue that Congress can introduce a uniform set of professional guidelines that would
standardize attorney regulation.37 By removing inconsistencies among
individual state rules, a lawyer would be free to provide services
nationwide. 38 Choice of laws issues would be rendered moot.3 9 Federalization also offers the added benefit of nationalizing the definition
of what constitutes the practice of law.4 °
In theory, the implementation of a national law license would
solve many of the problems currently facing practitioners. In practice,
a federal regime may simply replace one set of inefficiencies with
another, and, potentially, an even more disruptive set. First, Congress
would have to enact legislation codifying the applicable rules of professional conduct. Given that the efficacy of both the Model Rules and
the Model Code has been routinely questioned, simply deciding the
constituent rules of professional conduct would be a very long, contentious process. 4 1 Once the new ethical code is adopted, the establishment of the precedents required for resolving any inconsistencies in
language and interpretation would take decades. As a result, the same
uncertainty with respect to acceptable conduct that pervades multijurisdictional practice today would affect every lawyer in every state for
the foreseeable future.
Furthermore, congressional intervention would necessarily entail
the politicization of lawyer regulation. Many actors would be more
interested in pursuing specific policy objectives than focusing on the
36. Roger J. Goebel, The Liberalization of Interstate Legal Practice in the European
Union: Lessons for the United States?, 34 INT'L LAW. 307 (2007). Whether or not the
European system would ever be used as a model for an American reform effort is
unclear, particularly in light of strong anti-Europeanism from some quarters in the

United States. See, e.g.,

MARK STEYN, AMERICA ALONE: THE END OF THE WORLD AS WE

KNOW IT 153-76 (2008).

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Zacharias, supra note 17, at 391.
Id. at 382.
Id. at 353.
Id. at 356.
Id. at 339.
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broader goal of maintaining the integrity of the attorney-client
relationship.4 2
Some hybrid forms of national licensing have been suggested but
none seem feasible in practice. The creation of a federal ethical code
for enforcement by the states is impractical on several bases.4 3 Even
assuming that Congress could constitutionally delegate the enforcement of its legislation to the individual states, the likelihood of uniform application of the rules across all of the jurisdictions, a
prerequisite to achieving functional consistency, is minimal. 44 Federalization of select ethics provisions was proposed unsuccessfully in
Congress in 1983; however, a piecemeal approach to governing attorney conduct would likely result in subsuming the broader goals of the
ethics rules in favor of the micromanagement of certain issues.4 5
Finally, the promulgation of a code of ethics for federal practice, with
the hope that the states would gradually replace their individual rules
with those adopted by the federal courts, would also be of dubious
efficacy.4 6 The concept of a "federal bar" has been circulating among
commentators since at least 1938-the ABA itself called for a uniform
system of admission to federal courts in 1972-but it has never come
close to implementation. 4 7 Even if every state had the exact same provisions, discrepancies in enforcement would remain a key problem for
practitioners.4 8
V.

PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS FOR A REAL PROBLEM

ABA Model Rule 5.5 represents an important step toward establishing a framework for regulating multistate practice. However, while
it tries to balance the competing interests of public protection from the
unauthorized practice of law with the rights of clients to choose their
own attorneys, the rule fails to account for the client's interest in access
to legal services at a minimal cost. It codifies an unnecessarily intru42. See Dennis E. Curtis, Old Knights and New Champions:Kaye, Shcholer, the Office
of Thrift Supervision, and the Pursuit of the Dollar, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 985, 1006-11
(1993).
43. Zacahrias, supra note 17, at 387.
44. Id. at 376.
45. Id. at 375.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 404.
48. Expectations with respect to the qualifications and trustworthiness of foreign
attorneys vary from state to state. This is most evident in the wide range of standards
adopted for admission to practice pro hac vice in local courts. See Clint Eubanks,
Student Commentary, Can I Conduct this Case in Another State? A Survey of State Pro
Hac Vice Admission, 28 J. LEGAL PROF. 145, 145-46 (2003).

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2008

9

Campbell
Law Review,
31, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 2
CAMPBELL
LAWVol.
REVIEW

[Vol. 31:51

sive protocol that substantially raises the legal fees associated with
multijurisdictional practice and does little to promote transactional
efficiency.
For one, the modified rules continue to require out-of-state counsel to associate local counsel. Rules mandating the formal affiliation
of local counsel are not new. 4 9 However, the purported benefits of
working with a lawyer licensed by the host state are minimal. The
presence of local counsel can facilitate communication between the
tribunal and the parties, though with modern technology maintaining
an open dialogue between the court and the litigants should be relatively easy regardless of their respective locations.5 ° In addition, an
attorney from the host state might better understand the court's expectations and idiosyncrasies, assuming that the lawyer has appeared frequently enough before a particular judge, but a thorough review of any
applicable local rules and informal communication with local attorneys can educate foreign counsel on the personality of the court.5 '
Considering that the expense of associating another lawyer can be
cost-prohibitive-keeping an aggrieved party with a legitimate claim
from pursuing its remedies or making it adopt a less thorough strategy
because of the strain on resources-the arguments supporting the
requirement of affiliating local counsel are weak.5 2
Furthermore, the rules continue to be overly focused on an attorney's knowledge of black letter law. For the business attorney, information application and not rote knowledge is the key to the successful
representation of a client. Competent attorneys are not necessarily
those who have memorized the most statutes or cases.5 3 Rather, they
are distinguished by their ability to apply the law to the specific circumstances faced by their clients.5 4 In the business world, it is the
ability to use the law as a strategic and tactical tool to achieve desirable
ends for the client that makes an effective advocate.5 5 However,
existing ethical paradigms operate under the assumption that lawyers
are per se not competent to represent clients beyond the territorial limits of the licensing jurisdiction. Historically, "[t]he reason for prohibiting the unauthorized practice of the law by laymen is not to aid the
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
A Look
54.
55.

See id. at 145.
See id.at 149.
See id.
Id.
See Lorenzo A. Trujillo, The Relationship Between Law School and the Bar Exam:
at Assessment and Student Success, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 69, 78-79 (2007).
See id.
Id.
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legal profession but to safeguard the public from the disastrous results
that are bound to flow from the activities of untrained and incompetent individuals."5 6 Prior to the internet era, attorneys were justifiably
presumed to lack the knowledge requisite for providing professional
advice outside of those jurisdictions in which the attorneys were
licensed. Today, that assumption ignores the reality of the American
marketplace; attorneys can easily access statutes, cases, regulations,
and treatises from every state. Internet meetings, professional
networking websites, chat rooms, and the like are information clearinghouses. Lawyers can become familiar with the relevant jurisprudence in a state in a fraction of the time that it takes to foster a strong,
trusting relationship with business clients; an intricate knowledge of
the wants and needs of clients is at least as important to competent
representation as familiarity with black letter law. Lastly, acquiring
sufficient competency to represent clients in multiple jurisdictions is
not only feasible but increasingly a job requirement. Clients are
unwilling to retain new attorneys in every state in which their interests
are found and are demanding that their lawyers be available wherever
needed.57
It is also noteworthy that the law itself is changing in ways that
make multistate practice easier for attorneys. For one, the roles of both
federal and international law-as opposed to state law-are becoming
increasingly prevalent as transactions more frequently involve actors
located across the country and around the globe. 58 At the same time,
variations between the laws of the individual states are becoming less
discernable. For example, the adoption of the Uniform Commercial
Code has normalized the practice of law in areas such as sales of
goods and secured transactions to the extent that the statutory differ59
ences between jurisdictions are becoming increasingly insignificant.
The modified rules also underestimate the ability of modern business owners and managers to select capable professionals. In fact, the
56. In re Baker, 85 A.2d 505, 511 (NJ. 1951).
57. Even having offices in multiple states may violate the prohibition against
entering into a business endeavor with a non-lawyer. For example, Georgia prohibits
attorneys licensed there from entering into partnerships with "non-lawyers" without
specifying whether an attorney licensed in another state, but not in Georgia, is a "nonlawyer." If so, a large Atlanta-based firm that has offices in Alabama, staffed with
attorneys not licensed to practice in Georgia, would be operating in violation of
Georgia's ethical rules. GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4(b) (2004).
58. See Peter S. Margulies, Protecting the Public Without Protectionism: Access,
Competence and Pro Hac Vice Admission to the Practiceof Law, 7 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L.
REV. 285, 287 (2002).
59. Id.
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current licensing regime assumes that legal consumers are incapable
of determining for themselves whether or not an attorney is competent
to render necessary services. 6 0 Business owners and entrepreneurs
may very well be able to identify the exact skills, experience, and
knowledge necessary to perform desired tasks. 6 ' These clients are
capable of making reasoned decisions to work with familiar, trusted
attorneys that can quickly acclimate to the idiosyncrasies of practice in
a foreign jurisdiction. It should be the province of the business owner
or entrepreneur, and not the state, to make that determination. In fact,
the ability of business clients to effectively select counsel with respect
to multistate operations has already been explicitly recognized by
those jurisdictions that have enacted special provisions for in-house
lawyers. 62 For instance, Ohio expressly permits attorneys licensed
elsewhere to obtain a Certificate of Registration and practice on behalf
of non-governmental employers in that state.63 In 2002, the ABA proposed an amendment to Model Rule 5.5 that exempted in-house lawyers from traditional rules prohibiting the unauthorized practice of
law.64 There is no reason not to expand these permissive rules to cover
attorneys who provide the equivalent of in-house services to more than
one corporate or business client.65
In sum, the laudable goal of safeguarding the client from incompetent lawyers does not require broad prohibitions on extra-jurisdictional

60. Even within the legal services industry, there is a commonly held belief that the
client is in need of constant, court-sponsored protection from the unscrupulous or
incompetent practitioner. See, e.g., Randall T. Shepard, On Licensing Lawyers: Why
Uniformity is Good and Nationalization is Bad, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 453, 459
(2004) ("Communication and enforcement of professional norms would prove
difficult as attorneys roam from state to state with no knowledge and little recourse by
the local governing bar.").
61. See, e.g., Aaron Larson, How to Hire an Attorney, http://www.expertlaw.com/
library/consumer/howtohire.html (last visited Oct. 04, 2008).
62. See DEL. SuP. CT. R. 55.1, available at http://www.courts.delaware.gov/Rules/
?scr.pdf.
63. OHIO SuP. CT. R. VI § 3, available at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/Rules/
govbar/govbar.pdf; see also WASH. CT. A.P.R. 8, availableat http://www.courts.wa.gov/
court-rules/?fa=court_rules.display&group=ga&set=APR&ruleid=gaapr08.
64. COMM'N ON MULTJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE, supra note 23, at 10 (noting that
corporate counsel could not practice in a non-licensing jurisdiction if the
representation would otherwise require an appearance pro hac vice).
65. In light of the ready access to all of the materials necessary to provide legal
services across state lines, practice restrictions based on arbitrary jurisdictional
boundaries may run afoul of the Commerce Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol31/iss1/2

12

2008]

Fried: Licensing
LawyersINin the
Modern Economy
LICENSING
LAWYERS
THE MODERN ECONOMY

practice. 6666 Instead, it mandates the adoption of an ethical protocol
that recognizes both the risks presented by foreign, unlicensed attorneys and the benefit to clients of working with a familiar, trusted
counselor.6 7
A practical paradigm for regulating multijurisdictional practice
begins with abandoning the presumption of incompetency that accompanies the lack of a law license in a given state. 68 Rather, having graduated from an accredited law school, passed the bar, and obtained a
license from and admission to practice in the courts of one jurisdiction, it should be assumed that a lawyer is competent to practice in any
of the states, at least in certain areas of expertise.6 9 Counsel should be
required to become familiar with the applicable law prior to beginning
the representation. When ethical questions arise concerning the conduct of an attorney in a given situation, the critical inquiry should
concern that attorney's conduct under the specific circumstances of
the representation. This analysis is the proper measure of whether an
attorney was competent to render advice on a foreign jurisdiction's
laws.
Furthermore, the state government agencies charged with the
licensing and oversight of lawyers should monitor the foreign attorneys
representing clients in that jurisdiction. State disciplinary boards are
generally charged with policing the legal profession. 7 When a lawyer
is accused of violating an ethical provision, these agencies are respon66. Cf. McManus, supra note 4, at 534-37 (arguing that regulation of lawyers was
instituted in the twentieth century as a means of curbing entry of new lawyers into
what was perceived at the time to be a saturated market).
67. The American Corporate Counsel Association (ACCA) has proposed a
solution-sometimes called "The Driver's License Model"-for in-house attorneys who
occasionally practice in jurisdictions in which they are not licensed. The lawyer's
home state license would be sufficient to authorize practice in a foreign state and
counsel would be subject to its rules and laws of practice (including its disciplinary
process). Letter from Susan Hackett, Senior Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Ass'n of
Corp. Counsel, to Am. Bar Ass'n (Oct. 10, 2007), http://www.acc.com/vl/public/
ACCPolicyStatement/upload/ACCCommentLetterReABAModelRuleforRegistrationof
InHouse.pdf.
68. McManus, supra note 4, at 528. It is worth noting that the author is also a
practicing attorney.
69. This assumption is already made in those instances where foreign lawyers are
admitted to practice before the courts of a state pro hac vice. In addition, many states
offer expedited licensing to out of state lawyers who are authorized to practice in
another state and have actively worked as attorneys for a minimum number of years.

See Eubanks, supra note 48.
70. See, e.g., TENN. SUP. CT. R. 8.
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sible for investigating and, as appropriate, prosecuting the attorney. 71
Because most operate under the aegis of the state supreme court, they
have wide enforcement powers.7 2 Accordingly, if a foreign attorney
violates the host state's code of conduct, the host's disciplinary board
would have the authority to take action against that lawyer.
Because the goal of regulation is not to punish attorneys but to
make sure that consumers of legal services have access to skilled, capable counsel, the same agency responsible for disciplining lawyers after
misconduct can also assist in helping clients use preferred foreign
attorneys. For example, the board could publish information deemed
indispensable for foreign lawyers practicing in that state, such as special rules of practice and procedure in effect in the jurisdiction. It
could also provide access to practitioners licensed in the host state
who would be available to consult or work with visiting attorneys on
specific issues. The board could offer seminars-in person, on video,
or by the internet-designed to familiarize foreign lawyers with the idiosyncrasies of state law. In other words, the board would be proactive
in helping prevent costly mistakes instead of simply providing clients
with an opportunity to punish attorneys after attorneys have allegedly
run afoul of ethical provisions. While visiting attorneys would be
encouraged to use these resources-and in fact would be exposed to
greater liability if the materials are not used-they would be entirely
voluntary. A reasonable fee collected from foreign lawyers would pay
for these programs.
State and local bar associations should provide the same
resources outlined above for foreign practitioners. Further, the bar
should provide materials to apprise visiting lawyers of key differences
in state law and create a network of consultants who would be available to answer questions posed by visiting practitioners. A host state
should also insist that foreign jurisdictions provide the same resources
and support services to its lawyers.
Finally, the legal community as a whole should begin taking the
next steps toward codifying and enacting a protocol for licensing that
removes unnecessary barriers to multijurisdictional practice. This
requires fundamental changes to the existing licensing paradigms and
would provide a universal set of norms to which all practitioners
would be required to adhere. For example, counsel should be required
to disclose to a client, in writing, that counsel is not licensed in the
jurisdiction in which services are to be rendered and to explain the
71. See, e.g., id. at R. 9.
72. Id. at R. 9.
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risks inherent in undertaking such representation. Second, the attorney must be licensed and in good standing in at least one jurisdiction
with an interest in the subject matter of the representation (for example, a state where at least one party to a transaction resides or has its
principal place of business). Third, the onus should be squarely on
the lawyer to insure that the lawyer takes all reasonable measures
needed to become and remain competent to provide the services for
which the lawyer is hired. In the event that an issue of competency is
raised before a disciplinary board, it should be incumbent upon the
attorney to establish that, in light of the totality of the circumstances,
the attorney's efforts to become familiar with the relevant jurisprudence were reasonable. Finally, counsel should be subject to the applicable rules of conduct in the host state to the extent that it has the
predominant interest in adjudging the propriety of any act or omission
of counsel within its borders. Absent a compelling justification, a
sanction meted out by one jurisdiction should have the same effect
everywhere else. Thus, if a lawyer is disbarred in Wyoming, the lawyer
should effectively lose his or her license to practice in the United
States.73
CONCLUSION

Until the 1990s, an attorney's access to the legal authorities of
another state was often limited. Such access generally required proximity to a large law library with thousands of volumes of printed material. It would have been monumentally inefficient for an attorney in
Pennsylvania wholly unfamiliar with Oregon law to attempt to give
advice to a client looking to open a business in the Beaver State. Why
should a client pay for a trip to the library and hours of research when
an attorney in Oregon could answer the same questions more quickly
and cheaply? Furthermore, the barriers to multijurisdictional representation were self-sustaining. Since lawyers did not often practice
outside of their licensing state, few of those with access to the necessary information mastered the requisite skills to do so efficiently.
73. COMM'N ON MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE, AM. BAR ASS'N, REPORT 201D, at 3
(2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mjp/201d.pdf. The ABA called for a
reciprocal disciplinary scheme that required each state to impose the same sanction as
the adjudicatory jurisdiction unless: (1) the attorney was not afforded procedural due
process by the adjudicatory jurisdiction, (2) the proof of misconduct was so lacking as
to provide the court with a clear conviction that it could not, consistent with its duties,
accept the conclusions of the adjudicatory jurisdiction, (3) the discipline would
constitute a grave injustice or violate the state's public policy, or (4) the reason for the
original proceeding no longer existed. Id.
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However, over the past twenty years, the amount of information to
which attorneys have access has increased exponentially. An attorney
can use the internet to instantly summon the statutes, cases, regulations, and rules of any jurisdiction within the United States. The cost
is minimal or nonexistent. Now the lawyer in Philadelphia can easily
become familiar with the Oregon procedures for incorporating and
prepare the necessary documents for the client. The result is beneficial
to both the attorney, who can expand the scope of his or her services
beyond state lines, and to the client, who can use one lawyer or law
firm that he or she trusts to provide a certain set of services.
While the practice of law is changing at breakneck speed, and
even as lawyers adapt to new economic realities, the regulatory scheme
governing the licensing and certification of lawyers to practice has
remained stagnant.7 4 For the most part, regulations governing the
unauthorized practice of law were adopted at the turn on the twentieth
century when multijurisdictional practice was the exception and not
the rule. The ABA and several states have begun to address the effect
of modern economic realities on the practice of law, but substantive
measures that would benefit both lawyer and client have not been
implemented. It is time for that to change.

74. Twenty-two states have exceptions that encompass both in house counsel and
corporate counsel; each state has different requirements for meeting its exceptions.
ALA. BAR ADMISSION R. IX.; CAL. CT. R. 9.46; COLO. CT. R. 222; CONN. CT. R. § 2-15A;
DEL. CT. R. 55.1; D.C. CT. APP. R. 49; FLA. BAR REG. R. 17-1.1; IDAHO B. COMM'N R. 220;
IND. R. ADMIS. B. & Disc. ATT'Y R. 6 § 2; IOWA CT. R. 31.16; KAN. SuP. CT. R. 706; Ky.
SuP. CT. R. 2.111; MICH. BD. LAW EXAM'RS R. 5; MINN. ADMIS. B. R. 9; Mo. SuP. CT. R.
8.105; NEv. SuP. CT. R. 49.10; OR. BAR ADMISSION R. 16.05; R.I. SuP. CT. R. 9(b); S.C.
APP. CT. R. 405; UTAH R. GOVERNING BAR ADMISSIONs R. 14-720; WASH. A.P.R. 8(f) &
WASH. A.P.R. 18. Virginia is the only state that carves out a corporate counsel
exception without an accompanying in house exception. VA. SuP. CT. R. 1A:5. At least
three states lack both in house and corporate counsel exceptions while nonetheless
extending a foreign attorney exception that makes in house and corporate counsel
experience relevant. N.C. ADMISSION PRAc. R. .0502; OKLA. STAT. tit. 5, § 1-App. 5- R.
2(b) (2006); TEX. R. GOVERNING BAR ADMISSIONS R. XIII. While Nebraska expressly
makes neither an in house exception nor a corporate counsel exception, it does extend
an extremely liberal foreign attorneys exception that will often cover both in house
counsel and corporate counsel. NEB. REV. STAT. § 7-109 (2006).
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